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Prerequisite
Th L M d l (LM) E i t l C t l S t e unar o u e  nv ronmen a  on ro  ys em 
(ECS) Design Considerations and Failure Modes Lesson, 
Part I is a prerequisite to this lesson.
Objectives
 Describe the Lunar Module (LM) Environmental Control 
S t (ECS) b t t ti d d iys em  su sys em es ng an  re es gn.
 Summarize the Lunar Module (LM) Environmental Control       
System (ECS) in-flight failures.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
Th O S l d C bi P i ti S ti e xygen upp y an  a n ressur za on ec on 
provided source O2 and cabin pressure.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
Th C bi R d E O V l h d e a n epress an  mergency xygen a ve a  
some problems during feasibility testing, showing the valve 
seat to be susceptible to permanent seating.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
Fi t th h d th l l t i l f Vit B t rs , ey c ange  e va ve sea  ma er a  rom on  o 
Viton VB90.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
D i t t ti th t t ur ng accep ance es ng, e new sea s were seen o 
crack.  The shape of the seat and seal were changed.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
Th d i f il d ib ti t t t ti Th e new es gn a e  v ra on- empera ure es ng.  e 
seat was again changed to provide better centering and 
resist lateral movement.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
 N i l ti f th l i d b l d “b ” fom na  opera on o  e va ve was accompan e  y a very ou  ang  rom 
the high-pressure gas expanding to produce a shock wave.
 valve was not actually being damaged
 decision was made not to change the design again        
Cabin Repressurization and 
Emergency Oxygen Valve
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
 The Oxygen Demand Regulators provided suit loop pressure regulation.  
 original design sensitive to vibration
 various aneroids and mass-balancing techniques reduced the leakage to acceptable 
levels
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
 The Oxygen Demand Regulators provided suit loop pressure regulation.  
 original design sensitive to vibration
 various aneroids and mass-balancing techniques reduced the leakage to acceptable 
levels
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
 Th l t t i t d b t h t i j t d i t the regu a ors were con am na e  y wa er w en s eam was n ec e  n o e 
system for tests.
 water collected at the point shown in the system
 blown up into the regulators when the 34.5 KPa (5 psia) system was returned to sea                
level 
LM Suit Line Elevation Schematic
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
 The Cabin Dump and Relief Valves provided cabin pressure relief at 38.9 KPa 
(5.6 psi) and allowed manual cabin depress.
 vibration testing -- the valves leaked
 volume filler in the servo chamber generating particle contaminants        
 filler was changed to molded silicone rubber gaskets
Cabin Dump Relief Valve
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
 Th R ti B t Di k i th d t t hi h O2 te esea ng urs  s s n e escen  s age g -pressure  sys em 
provided worst-case pressure relief for tank overpressure. 
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- OSCPS
ll d h O2 f bi ft b t di k t a owe  enoug   or one ca n repress a er a urs  s  rup ure
 poppet would reseat, once the pressure was low enough for the Belleville 
washers to push it closed
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
Th At h R it li ti S ti d CO2 d t f e mosp ere ev a za on ec on remove   an  wa er rom 
the air.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 B d h b t t id h t dd l l l li t thase  on vacuum c am er es s, a rap  c ange o a  g yco  oop coo ng o e 
flow to the Liquid Cooling Garments was made in time for LM-5 (Apollo 11).
 deleted the cabin heat exchanger and added a suit water loop/glycol loop heat 
exchanger
 emphasis was on  minimum changes, not  efficiency
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 The Water Separators underwent several changes:      
 gas-side pressure drop was reduced
 pitot tube improved
 bearing supports upgraded
 assembly method changed  
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 I th l t t f d l tn e a er s ages o  eve opmen :
 several stator blades were blocked to increase the speed of the gas into the 
turbine blades
 blade angle was changed 
 wire mesh added
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 Changes aimed at improving the pumping capability with lower total gas flow.  
During qual testing, the unit failed to restart after shutdown.  Ullage water retained 
in the unit had settled to the bottom and created resistance.  
 clearances revised 
 drains added
 additional stator blades blocked
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 Post the Apollo 1 
fire, the Suit 
Isolation Valve 
changed to a fast-
acting automatic 
electric valve .
¾ several units 
became sluggish 
ft t da er repea e  
actuations
¾ minor materials 
hc ange was 
required 
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 The CO2 Sensor had several problems:    
 to compensate for vibration sensitivity, 
was mounted on isolators
 a more rugged IR source was used      
 an AC ground (R-C network) added to 
eliminate EMI  
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
t t i f t t l f d o preven  corros on rom wa er exposure, me a  sur aces were epoxye .
 cal changes due to  out-gassing from the conformal coating required it be 
changed
 thermistor added to compensate    
for temperature changes
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 The original LiOH Cartridge design had granular LiOH that abraded under vibration and             
released “dust”, which was very caustic to eyes, nose, and throat.  
¾ improved manufacturing techniques
¾ compressing the granules (originally with polyurethane foam, but changed to a metallic spring 
design after the Apollo 1 fire)       
¾ cartridge filler material changed from Dacron to Teflon  
¾ snap-in orifice was added after Apollo 11 to regulate air flow rate and prevent water separator 
overspeed
Primary LiOH Cartridge
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 The Suit Fan Motors had:    
¾ failures of power transistors
¾ a tendency to start rotating the wrong direction
f h l bb d d i t ti d th l h d¾ an w ee  ru e  ur ng es ng an  e c earances were c ange
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¾ bearing problems from contamination, inadequate lubrication, and 
bearing race brinelling.  These were fixed by:
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Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
¾ bearing problems from contamination, inadequate lubrication, and bearing 
race brinelling.  These were fixed by:
better cleaning
diff ta eren  grease
an improved bearing pull                                                                            
fixture
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 Shimming was used to prevent inducing EMI into the fan ductwork, and 
the fans had to have an EMI filter
¾ filters were getting damaged by the soldering process
¾ to fix this, moved the heavy wire solder connection point farther away from 
the capacitor lead
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- ARS
 Replacement of the old type units already installed in vehicles was only 
successful when performed by one specific, meticulous technician.  The highly 
skilled technician was awarded a Snoopy award for his efforts.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- WMS
 The Water Management Section provided the crew’s drinking water 
and the water to the sublimators for cooling.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- WMS
 The Water Tank
bladders:
 found to adhere   
between folds when 
stored collapsed
 prevented by storing the 
tanks with the water 
side pressurized with 
several psi of dry 
nitrogen
 a bladder tear was 
found on LM-7 (no 
specific cause ever   
identified)
 X-rays and gas leakage 
tests were used after 
that
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- WMS
 All the LM water was 
loaded before launch:
 chlorine could not be    
used as a bacteriocide --
incompatible with the 
sublimators
 iodine was introduced
 iodine depletion (via 
diffusion of iodine vapor 
f th t th hrom e wa er roug  
the bladder) rate 
increased with each 
iodine addition 
 the only iodine-
containing water 
introduced into the tank 
was the flight load
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- WMS
Th W t P R l t i d ti l t e a er ressure egu a or exper ence  par cu a e 
contamination and corrosion. Corrective measures were to:
¾ minimize exposure time to water during testing
¾ dry the system thoroughly
Reference pressure from ARS
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- WMS
D i h k t f LM 4 l t f il d d t ur ng c ec ou  o  - , one regu a or a e , ue o 
corrosion and particulates
¾ redundant regulator added to the backup system for subsequent 
vehicles
Reference pressure from ARS
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- WMS
S t t l t t 3 45 t 6 9 KP (0 5 t 1 i) it e  o regu a e o .  o .  a .  o  ps  over su  
pressure.
¾ reference pressure line contained small orifices
Reference pressure from ARS
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- WMS
 The orifices became plugged.
¾ caused an improper reference pressure and 
a high water pressure to the sublimators
¾ caused the water separators to pump 
against a high head pressure
¾ water not pumped out of 
th it i it
Reference pressure from ARS
e su  c rcu
¾ orifices were removed
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- WMS
 The requirement that no viable organism be deposited on the moon 
called for a Bacteria Filter in the water system.  
 gas from N2 dissolved in the water blocked the 0.22 micron filter
 requirement was relaxed for the sublimator line      
 bacterial filter was used on the cabin dump valve for Apollo 11
 requirement was dropped for subsequent missions
Water Bacterial Filter
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The Heat Transport Section removed the excess heat from the LM 
through a water/glycol coolant loop feeding water sublimators.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The original cooling fluid mix was to be identical to that used in the 
CSM.  
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Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The original cooling fluid mix was to be identical to that used in the 
CSM.  
¾ did not have sufficient heat transport capacity for the LM’s needs
¾ a greater percentage of water was needed
¾ raised the freezing point of the coolant from -54 degC (-65 degF) to  -19 
degC (-2 degF)
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The original cooling fluid mix was to be identical to that used in the 
CSM.  
¾ did not have sufficient heat transport capacity for the LM’s needs
¾ a greater percentage of water was needed
¾ raised the freezing point of the coolant from -54 degC (-65 degF) to  -19 
degC (-2 degF)
¾ still below temperatures the LM coolant would experience
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The change also required a change in pH.  
¾ prior to flight for LM-5 (Apollo 11) a crystalline precipitate was found in 
the fluid
¾ determined to have been caused by a change in the NaMBT used
¾ crystals were so soft and fragile that they caused no problems with the 
orifices, pumps, etc. of the HTS
LM 5 fl ith thi i¾ -  was own w  s m x
¾ previous grade of NaMBT was used for subsequent vehicles, without 
crystal formation
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The heart of the heat rejection capability of the HTS was its Water 
Sublimators.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The heart of the heat rejection capability of the HTS was its Water 
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 hot glycol solution passed through channels beside other channels 
i i i dconta n ng pressur ze  water
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The heart of the heat rejection capability of the HTS was its Water 
Sublimators.
 hot glycol solution passed through channels beside other channels 
i i i dconta n ng pressur ze  water
 the other wall of the water channels was porous, allowing water to seep 
into vacuum 
channels freeze, , 
and then 
sublimate to 
id thprov e e 
cooling 
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 Difficulty was encountered  
in brazing the porous plates 
without plugging the pores
 the early units degraded    
with usage time and had 
insufficient total capacity
 tried porous plates with    
higher porosity
 welded fins to the plates to 
eliminate brazing problems
 increased the density of the 
heat-transfer fins in the 
coolant passages
i l t d b tt lit mp emen e  e er qua y 
controls to ensure that the 
porous plates were 
installed facing the right 
direction
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
O i i ll hl i r g na y, c or ne was 
being added to the water as 
a bacteriocide.
 caused a buildup of a 
residue on the steam 
passage side of the 
porous plates
 resulted in a depression of 
th f i i t de reez ng po n  an  
water breakthrough
 forced the LM program to 
go to iodine as the biocide 
in the water system   
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The units tended to 
degrade by 
accumulating 
corrosion products 
during storage.
l d i f a so ur ng use rom  
blockage of pores by  
contaminants
hi h f a g er per ormance 
was required at 
acceptance than the 
units would need in    
flight
 the units were stored in 
a dry N2 environment   
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 Quick Disconnects were used for several connections in the HTS.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 Loss of lubricant was a problem 
whenever the system was 
drained.
¾ isopropyl alcohol was used to     
flush the system
¾ it dissolved the lubricants
¾ prevented free action of the 
moving parts and leakage in gas      
leak checks
¾ GSE QDs were modified to allow 
reapplication of  lubricants
¾ no QD that ever showed such a        
leak was allowed to fly
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The alcohol flushes of the system also caused a plasticizer in the            
polymers in the QDs to shrink. 
 alcohol flush times were controlled to be less than                                                    
the minimum time seen to affect the plasticizer       
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The original design of the cooling loop did not include an 
accumulator.
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The original design of the cooling loop did not include an 
accumulator.
 had the potential to interconnect the water system with the glycol 
( i di k) h h ldsystem v a a puncture s  so t at t e water system cou  act as an 
accumulator, if needed
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The original design of the cooling loop did not include an 
accumulator.
 not only was this irreversible, happened inadvertently several times 
d i d iur ng groun  operat ons
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The configuration after puncture allowed glycol to enter the water 
line feeding the sublimators (depending on relative pressures).
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The configuration after puncture allowed glycol to enter the water 
line feeding the sublimators (depending on relative pressures).
 caused a problem in the LTA-8 Hot Case test by lowering the freezing 
i f h bli h i h i ld fpo nt o  t e su mator water to t e po nt t at ce wou  not orm 
(sublimator breakthrough)
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The configuration after puncture allowed glycol to enter the water 
line feeding the sublimators (depending on relative pressures).
 accumulator was added to the glycol system
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 The Coolant Accumulators proved difficult to build.  
 diaphragm was the sealing gasket, and irregularities caused 
inadequate sealing forces
 size of the flange groove was reduced                                               
to achieve proper bead squeeze
 flange had to be redesigned to control                                             
the amount of squeeze   
 torquing the retaining ring                                                                     
to high values caused the                                                        
diaphragm to wrinkle
 had to add screws
 finally stopped the                                                                           
leakage
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
 After the leakage problems with 
the Coolant Accumulators was 
fixed, a large crack was found at 
th l ti f t i ie ang e sec on o  a re a n ng 
ring (blue in the diagram).
 the material (aluminum 2024T4) 
was being subjected to stresses     
greater than allowed for stress 
corrosion control
 alloy had to be changed and the 
cross-section increased. 
This is an example where the 
solution when one problem 
caused another .
Subsystem Redesign Considerations -- HTS
Th l t l t d i th bi d d d e coo an  pumps were oca e  n e ca n an  pro uce  
high noise levels.
¾ noise was not from the pumps themselves resonances within the 
lines and structures
¾ expansion device (muffler) that first flew on LM-8 (Apollo 14) 
downstream of the pumps
Objectives
 Describe the Lunar Module (LM) Environmental Control 
S t (ECS) b t t ti d d iys em  su sys em es ng an  re es gn.
 Summarize the Lunar Module (LM) Environmental Control       
System (ECS) in-flight failures.
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 5
Apollo 05 (LM 1 Flight Verification)
 Ascent water tank 2 leak indication,
  -   
even before launch  
 No leakage seen  
 Tank pressurant suspected
 Quantity great enough for mission,   
even at leak rate;                                  
so no action taken,   
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 9
Apollo 09 (LM-3 Earth Orbit Manned Flight Test)
 High cabin noise level
O i i d l
        
 ne crewman mprov se  earp ugs
 Testing in another LM ID’d the glycol loop pumps
 Acoustic coupling into the lines and the pressure vessel  
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 9
Apollo 09 (LM-3 Earth Orbit Manned Flight Test)
 Cabin fans were also contributors
S b t i i d l f t ti
        
 u sequen  m ss ons use  on y one an a  a me
 Crew were fitted with earplugs with 10 dB noise suppression
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 10
Apollo 10 (LM-4 Lunar Descent Flight Test)
 High cabin noise
       
 Resulted in cabin fan being powered off 
after 30 minutes
 Post-flight tests performed on LM-8         
to test use of flexible hoses to  
acoustically decouple the glycol pumps    , 
but resulted in only a slight reduction 
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 10
Apollo 10 (LM-4 Lunar Descent Flight Test)
 Oxygen purge system heater light never illuminated
       
 Ground tests could not repeat the signature
 Even without the heater, the minimum temperature of gas entering 
the helmet would be OK
 No modifications made for subsequent missions
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 10
Apollo 10 (LM-4 Lunar Descent Flight Test)       
A drop in cabin pressure at jettison, along with 1.5 m/sec (5 fps) separation 
velocity (measured from video)
(5 f ) ti l it ( d f id )
 A drop in cabin pressure at jettison,
 Indicated upper hatch opened
 ps  separa on ve oc y measure  rom v eo
    
(confirmed by flapping material in the 
same video)
 Docking tunnel was pressurized at the 
time the separation pyrotechnics were 
fired
 Added pressure from the pyros    failed 
the hatch latch, allowing cabin venting
 Air outflow slammed the hatch   mostly 
closed, except for a  small area that 
continued to vent the cabin slowly     
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 10
Apollo 10 (LM-4 Lunar Descent Flight Test)
 Lithium hydroxide cartridge 
performance (CO2 level)
       
                     
was anomalous
 Cartridge was returned for analysis    
 Cartridge may have had variances in 
moisture content (the manufacturing    
cause for this was not fully understood)
CO2  transducer tolerance was        
10% of full-scale
 In combination with the variance in   
the cartridge, explained the flight data
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 11
Apollo 11 (LM-5 Lunar Landing Flight)
 High CO2 indicated shortly after lunar module ascent
 Selection of secondary LiOH canister did not help
     
 C&W indication when primary LiOH was reselected
 Prior to lunar EVA, the ECS had been stopped
 Allowed condensate in the separator to drain into a tank         
 If the tank was not quite big enough, water could enter the suit loop 
(CDR noted water in his suit)
A li id i th li ld d l ff t CO2 t ny qu  n e ne wou  a verse y a ec   measuremen s
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 11
Apollo 11 (LM-5 Lunar Landing Flight)     
High CO2 indications – continued. To preclude this, the vent line was 
relocated upstream of the fans, effective for Apollo 13.
In-Flight Failures – Apollo 11
Apollo 11 (LM-5 Lunar Landing Flight)
 Slow cabin decompression observed prior to EVA
 For subsequent flights, the bacteriological filter omitted
     
 Decompression time reduced from about 5 minutes to 2 minutes
